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A CHILLY RECEPTION AT THE COURT
David J. Bederman*
My first Supreme Court argument was a humbling, but
ultimately valuable, experience. I represented the Petitioner in
Sandra Jean Smith v. United States.' Haven't heard of the case?
Well, don't feel bad. Even in this era of reduced Supreme Court
dockets, every term there tends to be at least one case that makes
Supreme Court watchers scratch their heads and wonder what
could possibly have motivated the Court to grant review. My
case-as reduced to its essence in the question I presented to the
Court in my petition for writ of certiorari-was deceptively
simple and (at the same time) fairly inconsequential: "Is
Antarctica a 'foreign country' for the purposes of the Federal
Tort Claims Act?"
Yes, you did read that correctly. My case was the first
before the Supreme Court to raise the question of the legal
consequences of acts done in Antarctica, in this case, whether it
was permissible to sue the United States for its negligent acts
there. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), on its own terms,
excludes jurisdiction over claims "arising in a foreign country." 2
My client's husband was killed when he fell to his death into an
unmarked crevasse outside the major United States base on the
frozen continent, so the question was fairly raised whether
Antarctica qualified as a "foreign country," and thus whether
claims arising there were excluded under the FTCA.
I had no delusions that Smith would be a landmark decision
for American jurisprudence. I had previous experience with such
a blockbuster case, having served as one of Petitioner's lawyers
(although not arguing counsel) in Lucas v. South Carolina
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1. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2003)

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

Coastal Council,3 a regulatory takings decision that had been a
highlight of the 1991 term. But I was not entirely prepared for
much of the derision that would greet the Court's ruling in
Smith. No less an authority than Kenneth Starr observed in the
Wall Street Journalthat
[l]ast term's embarrassingly skimpy docket.., included
such distinctly trivial issues as whether Antarctica is a
"foreign country" for purposes of the federal statute that
allows individuals to sue the~federal government for torts.
That issue arises every 20 years or so in litigation
somewhere in the U.S., and two courts of appeals were
indeed in conflict on the subject. But the issue is of singular
unimportance to the nation and its ever-growing body of
federal law.4
The ABA Journal, in an article appearing after the Smith
decision came down, wondered
why the justices chose to hear this particular case ....
[since] the number of FTCA claims arising in Antarctica
(or outer space) is presumably modest. Perhaps the answer
is that the justices have adopted the "Star Trek" creed,
resolving "to boldly go where no man has gone before." 5
Despite the unfavorable attention the case received, in
taking it to the Supreme Court I derived some satisfaction from
knowing that I was literally representing widows and orphans.
John Emmett Smith had been a good provider for his family. His
death had placed them in difficult financial straits. A negligence
suit against the United States was their only recourse. It seemed
an abuse of sovereign immunity for the federal government to
exploit a hyper-technical reading of the FTCA to ward off this
suit on jurisdictional grounds. I was pleased to take the case, and
declined a fee.
I got the brief from a very talented set of lawyers in Oregon
who had handled the matter in the trial court and the Ninth
Circuit. One of the local counsel could not continue with the
case because he had just been appointed to the Oregon state trial
bench. I agreed to handle the Supreme Court case because I had
3.
4.
J. A17
5.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Kenneth W. Starr, Trivial Pursuits at the Supreme Court, in Rule of Law, Wall St.
(Oct. 6, 1993).
David 0. Stewart, Out in the Cold, 79 ABA J. 44 (June 1993).
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previously written some law review literature about this
question, and, by virtue of my advocacy work for a number of
environmental organizations devoted to the Antarctic
environment, was concerned about the resolution of the FTCA
question's impact on other matters. In other words, I was an
academic babe in Supreme Court practice-land. I knew enough
to put together a workmanlike cert petition, and to think through
the legal issues raised by the case. But because of my
inexperience I had little appreciation for the unique aspects of
Supreme Court decisionmaking and the ways in which to make a
compelling legal argument, particularly in the face of the most
implacable foe that any Supreme Court litigator could ever
encounter: the genial attorneys of the Solicitor General's office.
One thing I later learned in my dozen years of Supreme
Court practice is that there is a world of difference in being
counsel of record for your side and merely being on the brief.
While I have also enjoyed the secondary role of a sherpataking another lawyer to the summit of Supreme Court
advocacy-there is a special thrill in being counsel of record and
assuming those extra duties of managing amicus parties, dealing
with opposing counsel, and preparing for argument. I was
fortunate in Smith that we had no amici to manage and corral.
(In virtually every one of the other dozen cases I have
participated in, there were a couple of amicus briefs, and
sometimes that number ballooned to over ten.) I was also lucky
that my opposing counsel in Smith, Christopher J. Wright, of the
SG's office, was gracious and unfailingly polite in our dealings.
He taught me that Supreme Court advocates are well and truly
officers of the Court, and that we were expected to set a higher
standard of professionalism and collegiality. His example has
motivated me to be affable in later cases I have handled, whether
in freely granting filing extensions, providing reciprocal
permissions for amicus briefs, and fully cooperating in the
preparation of the joint appendix, or in the simple courtesy of
inquiring from opposing counsel how their client wishes to be
referred to in Court (including the correct pronunciation of the
client's name).
As for the actual argument in Smith, I learned valuable
lessons from my lackluster performance. The first of these was
that it was not enough to go through the motions of preparation.
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I was far too cavalier in the weeks leading up to my March 8,
1993, encounter with the Court. Assuming that I knew the law
underlying the case better than anyone else, I really failed to
focus on the obvious weaknesses of my case and to prepare
coherent answers to what would be expected questions from the
Court. This was despite the able assistance I received from
student research associates and my generous Emory Law School
colleagues, who prepared me with two moot court benches. It
just did not sink in that the point of these exercises was to
anticipate the most dastardly and difficult lines of inquiry from
the Court and to be able to deftly answer them and to turn them
to my advantage. (That is why I now generate lists of such hard
questions and prepare copious notes of how best to handle
them.)
As just one example, contemporaneous with the final
briefing of my case was the United States' military intervention
into Somalia after the breakdown of civil authority there. My
colleagues suggested that there might be an analogy to be drawn
from an area like Antarctica that is sovereignless to a nation in
which the government had ceased to function. I was somewhat
dismissive of the analogy because it didn't seem legally precise
to me. But that was not the point. I should have expected that a
naturally curious Justice might be interested in using just such a
connection to explore the limits of my legal submission. And,
sure enough, I found myself in this exchange at oral argument:
MR. BEDERMAN: .... even though Antarctica has no
choice of law rules embedded in its law, because it has no
law, nonetheless the appropriate choice of law rule to
advocate is the notion of personal sovereignty, which
obviously has limited relevance today because there are
virtually no places in the world aside from Antarctica that
have no civil tort law. Otherwise it isQUESTION: Well, how about Somalia? Do you suppose
they have one right now?
MR. BEDERMAN: Justice O'Connor, I would imagine
that despite the conditions in Somalia, no one would doubt
that Somalian sovereignty, as one would understand that, is
still intact. And Somalia's civil tort law, although we might
not recognize it as such, still continues in force and that it
would-petitioner's submission would not be that Somalia,
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because of its current difficulties, ceases to be a foreign
country. Again, the petitioner's position is that the notion
of looking for the presence or absence of a foreign tort law
only comes into play when there is ambiguity over whether
there is a presence of a-of a foreign territorial sovereign.6
Looking back at this colloquy a decade later, I now realize
that while my answer was coherent, it was not an effective way
to address the concern that a Justice was raising: What would be
the potential tort exposure of the United States in other
situations? It was a perfectly reasonable concern, and the skilled
advocate's job is to anticipate and handle judges' reasonable
concerns.
Another element of oral argument I was unprepared for was
gauging the temperament of the Court and responding to a cold
bench. I somehow assumed that my case was the most
intellectually scintillating matter to come before the Court that
term. I expected that I would be literally bombarded with
questions, even though I may not have been particularly
confident about the answers I would offer. I was also assuming
that I would be closely questioned by Justice Scalia. The reason
for this anticipation was that the one other case in which the
applicability of the FTCA to Antarctica had arisen was the D.C.
Circuit's 1984 decision in Beattie v. United States.7 In that case,

the court of appeals had held that Antarctica was not a foreign
country under the Act, and that, therefore, cases against the
government could proceed. Writing a spirited dissent to that
decision was then-Judge Scalia. So I believed that I would be
engaged in a animated debate with the one Justice who was on
judicial record about the issue presented.
The dynamics of my actual oral argument were different
indeed. For starters, mine was the third case scheduled for the
day. (It's hard now to believe there was a time with the Court's
docket that more than two cases were argued daily!) The other
two cases wound up early, my case was called, and I was
summoned to the podium at about 11:40. The courtroom
emptied out, so I guess the public hardly regarded the case to be
as interesting as I supposed. I launched into my opening,
6. Tr. of Oral Argument at 7-8, Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (available
at 1992 U.S. Trans LEXIS 155).
7. 768 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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meticulously planned for a mere three paragraphs. I was
expecting the barrage of questions to come. But they did not.
And because I really had not planned a second or third wave of
points to use after the invocation of my mantra and my opening,
I was at a bit of a loss. Aside from Justice O'Connor's inquiry
with the Somalia analogy and a pointed set of questions from
Justice Souter on choice-of-law issues, I got no other questions.
And not a peep from Justice Scalia. After about ten minutes it
finally dawned on me that I had a really chilly bench (as perhaps
befitted the topic), and I concluded my argument in chief by
asking for questions. Getting none, I reserved the balance of my
time and sat down.
That put my opposing counsel in the hot seat, but after ten
minutes he was interrupted by the Chief Justice calling for
lunch. So Mr. Wright and I trudged downstairs to the Court
cafeteria for a light snack. He was gracious enough to say some
encouraging words, and to comment on the oddness of breaking
for lunch so deep into the argument. In any event, we resumed at
one o'clock, and he was able to finish the rest of his submissions
with virtually no interruptions, except for a flurry at the end.
I got up for rebuttal, realizing how little traction I had
gained with my arguments. It is not a nice feeling, but it's one I
suppose every experienced appellate advocate eventually
experiences: the sense that you are not persuading the Court, and
that your arguments are falling short of the mark. I made a game
attempt to shore up my position, and then Chief Justice
Rehnquist moved in for the kill. It was an exchange I will not
soon forget:
QUESTION: Mr. Bederman, how do you respond to the
Government's argument about 1346(b), that the United
States would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred?
MR. BEDERMAN: Chief Justice, my construction of
1346(b) is that if a private party would be liable as a
tortfeasor in Antarctica-to Mrs. Smith, say, as plaintiffthen it follows that the Government would likewise be
liable. And as the Government has conceded, Antarcticapardon my colloquialism-is not a legal black hole, that
law does apply there by virtue of these choice of law
principles.
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QUESTION: Well, but the Government's argument, as I
understand it, is that there is no tort law governing in-in
Antarctica, and therefore without regard to the foreign
nation exception, you are not brought within 1346.
MR. BEDERMAN: That would be so, Chief Justice, if,
under prevailing choice of law rules a private tortfeasor
would not-there would be no law applicable in a private
actionQUESTION: But the statute says the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred, which-and here the
act or omission occurred in Antarctica, it's conceded, didn't
it?
MR. BEDERMAN: Yes, sir.
QUESTION: And if there-if there is no law there, I-how
do you get to choice of law?
MR. BEDERMAN: Well, I read the-the Government's
reading of 1346(b) is, frankly, disjunctive. They would
prefer to eliminate the languages under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person. They would
prefer to read out that clause and simply look at the last
provision in isolation.
QUESTION: Whereas you would prefer to read out the last
clause?
MR. BEDERMAN: No, Chief Justice. If it were true that
under prevailing choice of law theories a-no private
action was permissible because the lex-lex loci delecti
was in Antarctica, we would have no case. But that is not
the law and therefore the fair reading of the entirety of
1346(b), in conjunction with the remainder of the statute
including the foreign country exception, leads inevitably to
a finding that Antarctica is not a foreign country and that
this action can proceed.'
When I look back on this exchange, I am pleased to see that
I stood my ground under this direct questioning. That was a
good lesson to learn. Based on what I have observed of Supreme
Court arguments, more cases have been lost by counsel seeking
to be agreeable and conceding points they should not, than by

8. Tr. of Oral Argument, supra n. 6, at 30-32.
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their standing firm. The Justices seem to agree. After I finished
this last exchange with the Chief Justice, he was smiling, and I
had no further desire to take the Court's time:
MR. BEDERMAN: I have no further substantive points.
QUESTION: Do you have any nonsubstantive points?
(Laughter.)
MR. BEDERMAN: I will not rise to that invitation, Chief
Justice.
(Laughter.)
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST:
Bederman. The case is submitted. 9

Thank

you,

Mr.

As I took my seat, I knew that I had probably lost. And
given the probing nature of his inquiries, I sensed that it would
be an opinion produced by the Chief himself, in the spare and
laconic style that I had grown to appreciate. I was later
vindicated in that prediction, and I lost eight to one. But I did get
a spirited dissent from Justice Stevens, substantially longer than
the Court's opinion, in which he at least gave some credence to
the legal theories I was advancing in the case. I didn't feel like
such a dolt.
My experience with Smith has conditioned much of my
subsequent Supreme Court practice. I have developed a
specialty of sorts in representing clients before the Court who
are resisting the application of various forms of sovereign
immunity (whether it is the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, foreign sovereign immunity, or even tribal
immunities). Given the difficult nature of arguing against
sovereign interests, I have learned that oral argument is a
distinctive element of appellate practice. I have conditioned
myself to take a fresh look at my case, to simplify it, to
ruthlessly expose the weaknesses in my argument, to know
9. Id. at 32.
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when and how to make key concessions, and to focus on what
legal ground I will have to defend to the death. My preparations
now for oral arguments are more searching-but also more
efficient. Over the years, I have also become more conscious of
the fact that my skills as a law teacher really do help me as an
advocate. My task in the well of the Court is, in an incredibly
short period of time and under the most daunting of conditions,
to educate a very special and distinctive audience. All the while,
I now realize, many (if not all) the Justices will be ready-just
as Justices Souter and O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist
were ready in Smith-to concentrate their considerable
intellectual energies on the weakest part of my submissions and
to render my case asunder.
My later experiences arguing before the Court have been
more pleasant. And that's not just because the outcomes were
more positive for my clients. In the unique arena of Supreme
Court advocacy, the key ingredient of success can often be the
lawyer's level of experience and comfort. This is not to say that
it always is so-I have observed plenty of arguments where a
first-time counsel bested an old hand, usually because they knew
their case better and were more modest in their legal
submissions. But I know that I am a better, more effective,
counsel having been on the losing end of the Smith decision, and
having realized the ways in which my performance could have
been improved.
I am also a better person. Other Supreme Court cases have
brought me more fame and accolades. I argued Smith before a
virtually empty courtroom. The case received little attention,
aside from the derisory hoots already mentioned. In a sense, it
was the most intimate kind of case one can argue before the
Court. The result only mattered in tidying up a Circuit split and
settling a pesky issue. But that's certainly not the way my client
saw it, nor is it the way I viewed the case on that day.
After the argument, I flew home, and told my wife of all
the day's events and my feeling that my best had not been good
enough. She took my hand, and kissed me, and told me that she
was proud of me for having fought the good fight. And then she,
a more experienced lawyer than I, predicted that I would
eventually look back on my first argument and see that part of
lawyering is to have the fortitude to responsibly represent your

60
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client's position against all odds, even when logic suggests that

you should give up or give in, but also to have the good grace to
accept the court's judgment. She was right, of course. I know
that now.

